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CARE-EFFECT OF PUBLIC CAIUUER's FINANCIAL
LlABILITY-Plaintiff sustained injuries when she fell between
defendant's subway car and a platform directly opposite the car door. The
cause assigned was the pressure from the closely packed crowd of subway
passengers during a rush hour which resulted in plaintiff's being "carried by
the crowd" into a position of danger. Defendant had shifted extra guards
to the overcrowded area. No evidence of disorderliness or gang action appeared.
In an action for damages due to defendant's negligence in failing to control
the crowd, held,. for defendant. Callaghan v. New Yark City Transit System,
204 Misc. 236, 125 N.Y.S. (2d) 796 (1953).
Though dealing with a fact situation ubiquitous in negligence cases, the
opinion in the principal case is unique in containing a forthright statement
that defendant public carrier could not financially afford an imposition of
liability for crowd action.1 The element of foreseeability so often used to
determine the presence of a duty and the various well-wom tests of legal
cause were ingeniously ignored by the court.2 The opinion is somewhat
reminiscent of the classic Ryan case, where a New York court held a railroad
not liable for damage due to fire spread from its locomotive-a liability, in
the words of the court, "against which no prudence could guard, and to meet
which no private fortune would be adequate."3 It is quite apparent that any
finding of duty or causation in cases involving public carriers is a product of
NEGLIGENCE-DUTY oF

CAPACITY ON

1 The court recognizes a trend toward stiffening the burden of plaintiffs seeking to
establish negligence on the part of subways, saying: ''Doubtless the courts realize that since
subways are not operated at a profit but at a heavy loss, the public welfare will not be
advanced by rules of decision imposing higher and higher standards of care upon the
Transit System••••" Principal case at 797.
2 See the early case of Hoag v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R. Co., 85 Pa. 293
(1877), for a typical application of the tests of unforeseeability and intervening force to
support a holding that there was no legal cause for the spread of fire from a train wreck.
3 Ryan v. New York Central R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210 at 216 (1866).
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judicial blending of such rationalizations as foreseeability, intervening cause
or last clear chance, and of public policy considerations. But realism may be
stifled by such a blend where the courts' legal rationalizations are stated while
their policy considerations go unsaid. It may be, as Professor Ehrenzweig
thinks, that a truer test of public enterprise liability for negligence lies not in
the foreseeability of a harm but in its "typicality," i.e., whether "the harm
was typical for its [the carrier's] activities, and thus calculable and reasonably
insurable."4 However, a public carrier's ability to insure against the results
of its negligence may turn on such conflicting policy questions as whether the
carrier operates at a loss and must be protected from bankruptcy or whether
it should be left to spread the cost of its liability throughout the community
via increased fares and taxes. Whichever rationalization, foreseeability or
typicality, is used, it seems clear that filtrations of social policy in a state
whose prosperity depends upon railroads will color the decisions of its courts.11
New York cases seem to indicate a trend in the direction of nonliability of a
subway for crowd injuries beyond the control of the carrier,6 and also an inclination for reduced liability in spread-of-fire cases involving railroads.7
Kansas, with acres of uninsured farmlands, exhibits an opposite social attitude
toward railroads.8 Notice of such contrariety in policy, when brought out
into the light from the penumbra} areas of a court's reasoning, may afford a
much more realistic basis of explaining results in some public carrier cases than
do the traditional standards and tests of duty and causation.
John E. Rieck.er, S.Ed.

4 EmraNZWEm, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT 58 (1951). See also note by same
author in 8 UNIV. Cm. L. Rllv. 729 (1941). The "typicality" test is criticized in Malone,
"This Brave New World-A Review of 'Negligence without Fault,'" 25 So. CAL. L. Rllv.
14 at 19 (1951).
5 Prosser, "Palsgraf Revisited," 52 l\hCH. L. REv. 1 at 30 (1953).
6 See Accetta v. City of New York, 48 N.Y.S. (2d) 487 (1944); Vogeley v. City of
New York, 48 N.Y.S. (2d) 487 (1944); McKinney v. New York Consol. R. Co., 230
N.Y. 194, 129 N.E. 652 (1920); Wittes v. City of New York, 265 App. Div. 810, 37
N.Y.S. (2d) 655 (1942). Cf. Allessi v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., 163 Misc. 815,
297 N.Y.S. 1011 (1937).
7 Ryan v. New York Central R. Co., note 3 supra; Alper v. Ramsden, 113 N.Y.S. (2d)
745 (1952).
s This New York-Kansas variance was the subject of a well-drawn comparison in
Prosser, "Palsgraf Revisited," 52 l\hcH. L. REv. l at 30 (1953). See also Atchison, T. &
S. F. R. Co. v. Stanford, 12 Kan. 354 (1874).

